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Abstract: This article questions the preconceived notions that participants in virtual worlds are
essentially  consumers.  Building  on  the  existing  scholarship  around  virtual  worlds  and
notwithstanding the current character of virtual worlds, this paper explores aspects of End User
Licence Agreements and notes the unfairness of their provisions, particularly the imbalance
between user and developer interests governed by such contracts. It argues that the contracts
cannot  be regulated with consumer protection legislation,  as  interests  such as  property  or
intellectual property are beyond the scope of consumer protection regimes. Finally, recognising
the  phenomenon  of  constitutionalisation  of  virtual  worlds,  the  article  argues  for  stronger
regulatory solutions in this domain, in order to strike a more appropriate balance between
competing interests in virtual worlds.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of virtual worlds (VWs) predates the emergence of the internet. Many authors
report that the development of VWs has started with the text-based, offline role playing games,
created on the basis of the different works of fiction, such as Tolkien’s books and ideas of world
building (Lastowka & Hunter, 2006, pp. 17-18; Erlank, 2012, pp. 22-23). The first text-based
interactive computer game appeared in 1970, The Colossal Cave Adventure (Lastowka & Hunter,
2004, p. 17), with real-time interactive computer games called MUDs (Multi-User Dungeon)
appearing by the end of the 1970s. These are first VWs. One early example of a MUD is MUD1,
created by Richard Bartle and Roy Trubshaw in 1979, at Essex University. The most famous
game in  this  group  (text-based  VWs)  was  LambdaMOO,  created  by  Pavel  Curtis  in  1990
Virtual worlds players – consumers or citizens?
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 2 October 2014 | Volume 3 | Issue 4
(Lastowka & Hunter, 2004, p. 20; Dibbell, 1998; Rex, n.d.).
Virtual worlds have continued to be a fascinating area for academic exploration. The scholarship
analysing the social, economic, technological, legal aspects started in the late 1990s, focusing on
the text-based VWs (Bartle, 1996). This continued throughout the 2000s, discussing visually
represented VWs and MMOPGs (massively multiplayer online role-playing games). The focus of
the early literature was mainly on technical, philosophical and governance issues of MUDs.
More substantive legal discussion started at the beginning of the 21st century, with seminal
works  on  private  law  aspects  of  VWs  (property  and  contracts).  This  academic  analysis
predominantly  tackled  the  following  issues:  economies  and  taxation  (Castronova,  2003;
Lastowka & Hunter, 2004), governance of VWs (Balkin, 2004; Crowley, 2006; Lastowka &
Hunter, 2004; Mayer-Schoenberger),  property and IP in VWs (Cifrino, 2014; Erlank, 2012;
Fairfield, 2005; Fairfield, 2007; Jankowich, 2006; Lastowka & Hunter, 2004; Reynolds, 2003),
contracts and consumer protection (Crowley,  2006; Jankowich, 2006; Riley,  2009); virtual
crime  (e.g.  Lastowka  &  Hunter,  2004;  Lodder,  2013).  This  paper  revisits  the  literature,
notwithstanding  the  current  character  of  VWs.  It  focuses  on  UK  and  EU  policy  issues,
occasionally referring to the US for comparative purposes. The comparison is significant as both
the majority of Western VWs case law originates from the US, and most commercially successful
VW platforms are based there.
The article does not discuss the widely analysed concept of property in virtual worlds (virtual
property).  Rather,  recognising the phenomenon of  constitutionalisation  of  VWs, this paper
argues for a more nuanced approach towards the recognition of in-world interests of users. It
suggests that the EU and UK regulators should aim to create policy and legislative solutions,
which would enable  VWs users/citizens to  take more control  over  their  virtual  assets  and
valuable VW accounts.
CONCEPTUALISATION OF VIRTUAL WORLDS
From an etymological perspective, VWs could be defined as states of human existence, which do
not  exist  physically,  are  not  real,  but  do appear  to  be  real  from the point  of  view of  the
programme or the user (The Oxford English Dictionary, 2013). From this definition, we could
extract  the most  important  features that  define contemporary VWs as  follows:  computer  -
moderated (users participate in VWs using computer and the internet); persistence (in the case
of VWs, this element is relative and depends on the viability of a particular business model);
environmental attributes (immersive and persuasive worlds, mimicking real world environment
and physicality); interactivity (players interact with each other, e.g. participating in World of
Warcraft quests); participation of multiple individuals (sometimes even millions, see data cited
further in the article) (Erlank, 2012 pp. 47-57; Bell, 2008).
Developers use different business models for their VWs. Some VWs are closed, used for military
or business simulations. Others are open, commercial worlds, where users can join for free, pay
a monthly fee (like World of Warcraft), or operate on the freemium basis (like Second Life),
where basic services are free, but value added services have a cost (see Fairfield, 2009 p. 53;
Riley, 2009, p. 890).
The umbrella term for VWs is MMOPGs (the term widely used in the scholarship cited above, in
addition to the versions such as MMOs, MMOGs), although the latter can be divided on the
basis of their player community and structure: game worlds or social worlds. In game VWs
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(massively multiplayer online role-playing games - MMORPGs), players adopt a specific role
and compete to achieve certain predefined goals (e.g. World of Warcraft, Eve Online). In the
social or unstructured worlds, the goals are less strictly defined, and the emphasis is on social
interaction with other players and with the environment (e.g. Second Life, IMVU). These VWs
are not games per se, but are better considered platforms for social interaction, or so called
“mirror worlds” (Kzero, 2014). The third kind of VWs is ‘kids’ worlds’, where children are the
targeted player demographic (e.g. Club Penguin) (Lastowka, 2010, p. 58).
We can also distinguish VWs by the technology employed to provide the user access to the
world, for instance: client-based (e.g. World of Warcraft), and those where the players can join
online (e.g. Second Life). Some games, including certain VWs (e.g. The Lord of the Rings Online,
Dungeons & Dragons Online, Everquest II, Diablo et al.) can also be accessed via intermediaries.
The most prominent is a platform called Steam (Steam, 2013), “an entertainment platform”,
which distributes computer games and other software, from both independent and established
software companies. It is also a communication, social networking of a sort and multiplayer
platform, enabling a broader range of interactions between players akin to social networks. The
further evolution of VWs includes innovative interaction hardware (e.g. Oculus Rift), bringing
even more reality to these worlds (Kzero, 2014).
This paper focuses on two case studies: World of Warcraft and Second Life. The reason for
choosing the US based VWs is that most of the successful Western VWs are hosted in the US
(Edwards, 2011), contractual choice of law provisions ordinarily use US law, and the majority of
common law cases have been resolved there (Fairfield, 2009, p. 430). Also, these examples are
chosen due to their domination on the market, their large user base, their societal impact and
‘cultural footprint’ (Quinn, 2010, p. 760). Second Life is currently perceived as declining in
popularity, but it is still worth mentioning as most of the existing case law involves this virtual
world. Sporadic references might be made to other VWs and platforms, but the main analysis is
based on these two virtual worlds.
For the purpose of this discussion, the term virtual assets (VAs) will be used to describe any
item, object or asset found in VWs that is used or created by the players (e.g. avatar, weapon,
land, house, clothes, furniture, and anything else that could be found in different VWs).
MAIN FEATURES OF VIRTUAL WORLDS’ END USER
LICENCE AGREEMENTS
Player obligations and rights, such as the allocation of ownership over virtual assets, intellectual
property  and different  other  rights  in  VWs are  established through contracts  between the
players and the providers. VW contracts come in the form of click wrap licenses (End User
Licence Agreements - EULAs; Terms of Service - ToS; rules of conduct and; different other
policies) and the impact of these contracts are widely disputed. They often leave little or no
freedom for the user and no other real choice apart from clicking “I agree” (Blizzard, 2014) or
declining the contract, therefore refusing to take part in the game (Humphreys and de Zwart,
2012; de Zwart, 2010; Erlank, 2012, p. 99; Pistorius, 2004; Lemley, 2006). Usually, the game
developers claim all the property and IP rights (Jankowich, 2006) associated with a VW. This,
as  seen  further,  is  currently  the  most  common  model  (Humphreys  and  de  Zwart,  2012;
Jankowich, 2006).
Blizzard, the World of Warcraft’s developer, expressly excludes any property rights of users in
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assets created or traded in the game, as well as forbidding transfers of accounts (Blizzard, 2014,
s.  4-5).  There are certain MMOPGs that permit users to retain IP rights in their creations
(Linden Lab, 2003). Second Life was the best known VW having used such a model (Vacca,
2008, p. 46). Linden Labs, developer of the virtual world Second Life, had promised to give
users relatively extensive rights over content created by users therein (Linden Lab, 2010, title 7).
However, these rights appear rather illusory, as Linden limits them to the game and refuses any
liability and compensation in the case of damage, loss of this property (Erlank, 2012, p. 201).
Nevertheless, by the way of insisting to regulate and limit virtual property, the developer seems
to implicitly recognise the existence of the user interests in their VAs (Erlank, 2012, p. 112).
Since the contractual status of VAs in World of Warcraft is rather clear as noted above, it is
interesting to look at Second Life’s alleged liberal contractual provisions. Second Life appears to
promise to grant and preserve a player’s  ownership of  their  virtual  creations (Linden Lab,
2003).  The current  ToS grants  users  intellectual  property  rights  in  their  creations,  if  any.
However, it denies property rights in the in-game virtual currency, i.e., ‘Linden dollars’ (Linden
Lab, 2014). Linden also denies any property rights in land that users can purchase in Second
Life. The land represents a limited licence granted by Linden, and not a real property right
(Linden Lab, 2014, s. 4.8.), and Linden disclaims any liability for modification, damages, loss of
land (Linden Lab, 2014, part 9; Blizzard, 2014 part XVII). The motive behind this change in
Linden’s terms and outlook on player’s ownership seems to be the case of Bragg, discussed later.
Linden appears to have realised the risks the recognition of virtual property might create (Evans
et al, Plaintiffs, v. Linden Research, Inc. et al, 2013).
Further, another pertinent issue is that the developers retain the right to unilaterally change or
terminate  the  contract  at  any  time  (Linden  lab,  2014,  part  5;  Blizzard,  2014,  part  XV).
Conversely, they do grant themselves a non-exclusive licence in players’ creations. Linden Lab,
for  example,  has  recently  widened  Second  Life  EULA  in  order  to  retain  unlimited  and
irrevocable rights to use and exploit users’ creations. This move left many players of Second Life
embittered, wanting to leave this VW (Korolov, 2013).
BRAGG V. LINDEN RESEARCH
The most famous US virtual worlds court case is Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc. (2007). Marc
Bragg sued Linden Research after they expelled him from the online community and reclaimed
his virtual assets, confiscating his VAs of roughly $2,000 in real-world money (Bragg v. Linden
Research, Inc., 2007, p. 611), claiming that Bragg had violated their ToS by improperly buying
the land at an auction. Second Life moved to compel arbitration according to the ToS. Bragg
argued that the contractual terms between Bragg and Second Life were unconscionable because
the agreement assumed too much power and was unreasonably biased against the user. The
court confirmed that the terms of service were unconscionable in relation to the arbitration
clause and knocked down the mandatory arbitration clause. The court also concluded that the
terms left the plaintiff with no effective remedy (Hetcher, 2008, p. 836). The property claim was
initially raised by Bragg, who had asserted that his in-game assets were in fact his property. The
court,  unfortunately, did not discuss this point,  so virtual property still  remains within the
confines of academic debates.
More recently (2012), in Evans et al v. Linden Research, Inc. et al., the central issue was again
fairness of the contract (provisions about suspension of accounts and users’ compensation). A
group of users claimed to own their VAs (Evans et al v. Linden Research, Inc. et al., 2012, Hr'g
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Tr. 27:12-28:11), and complained that they purchased virtual items and/or virtual land and later
had their accounts unilaterally terminated or suspended by Linden. These players were not
compensated for the value of the virtual land, items, and/or currency in their accounts. In
addition,  the plaintiffs  claimed that Linden made false representations about ownership of
virtual land and virtual items, and wrongfully confiscated these items from the class members
they sought to represent (Evans et al v. Linden Research, Inc. et al., 2012, Hr'g Tr. 27:12-28:11).
Linden disputed the claimed ownership, recognising only copyright in users’ creations (Evans et
al v. Linden Research, Inc. et al., 2012, Hr'g Tr. 37:7-10; 39:17-24; 53:15-24). Again, there was
no decision with respect to ownership. The case was settled (Evans et al v. Linden Research,
Inc. et al., 2012). It could be argued that this example illustrates Linden’s attitude and concerns
over ownership in VWs. Rather than proceeding with the case which could result in establishing
some kind of  property in virtual  assets  and thus endanger their  EULA and their  previous
position, the developer prefers to compensate the users.
Even the ‘liberal’ providers and platforms seem to be replicating the EULAs presented above.
For instance, Steam, a very successful platform (Wawro, 2014; Steam, 2014) is considered to be
user-friendly, open-source to an extent and an alternative to the traditional business models.
Valve, the owner of Steam, created a very restrictive EULA (Steam, 2014) for the content and
games/VWs acquired via Steam, resembling very much those of the other VWs. Apart from the
intellectual property rights (Steam, 2014, s.6), ownership by the players of their creations and
virtual money, contained in their wallets (Steam, 2014, part C), is limited, non-transferable,
with a wide licence taken by the provider, Valve Corporation (Steam, 2014, s. 6A). According to
the recently published research on VWs (Kzero, 2014), other popular VWs amongst adults -
 individuals with legal capacity, as required by the consumer protection and contracts law, thus
subject to this analysis - are the social worlds IMVU (120 million users), Utherverse (22 million
users), and sRepublic (6 million users). The analysis of these virtual worlds’ ToSs and EULAs
reveals, similar, mirroring, if not copying, of the previous EULAs, with the same issues around
licensing,  property,  IP and liability.  Research suggests  that  the provisions of  these EULAs
conflict with the user community norms and behaviours, thus lacking legitimacy and potentially
resulting in undesirable outcomes when it comes to their enforcement (Suzor, 2010; Suzor and
Woodford,  2013).  However,  notwithstanding  these  important  findings,  this  article  focuses
predominantly on the EULAs and their unfairness and does not provide a more detailed account
of the relevant community norms.
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND VIRTUAL WORLDS
The above analysis could hint, as many other authors do, to the fact that the contracts are prima
facie unfair (Jankowich, 2006, p. 50). The logical remedy for this would be challenging their
unfairness or unconscionable provisions in courts using consumer protection laws (Riley, 2009,
p. 907).
At the EU level, the Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
October 2011 on consumer rights would potentially apply. This Directive, not yet implemented
in the UK, encompasses the contracts regarding digital content, including games. Currently, at
the UK level, The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 is also potentially
applicable, if we recognise that when purchasing the licence to use software to enter the VW,
users do act as consumers. According to this regulation, terms that would be potentially deemed
as invalid include those limiting liability of the developer; those reserving the right to terminate
or modify terms discretionary and without notice; arbitration clauses, etc. (The Unfair Terms in
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Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, Sch. 2).
Both the UK and EU legislation address the issues such as provision of adequate information to
consumers, rights of withdrawal, liability, delivery and passing of risk. This legislation, however,
does not include the issues of property and IP rights, as the subject matter cannot be considered
unfair and this is out of scope of this legislation (The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
Regulations 1999 S. 6. (2) or Rec. 51; Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council  of  25 October 2011 on consumer rights;  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the
European Union 2012, art. 345). This law could apply to the parts of the contracts regulating
sale of the licence for using software. VAs in the form of players’ creations would not fall within
the definition of goods and services found in the consumer protection laws, as they are not
goods  or  services  sold  by  the  developers.  Alternatively,  we  could  consider  the  UK Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA), which applies to all contracts, not just consumer contracts.
Unfortunately, contracts dealing in any way with IP are beyond UCTA’s scope, with it instead
focusing on exclusion and limited contract clauses (Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, Sch 1 s. 1).
Similar, though much more limited protection can be found in California, mandated through
Consumers  Legal  Remedies  Act.  This  law  prohibits  inclusion  of  previously  discussed
unconscionable contract terms (California Civil Code §§ 1750 et seq).
So far, VW contracts have not been challenged often in the UK and US courts. In the UK, there is
no such case at the time of writing. In the US cases of Bragg and Evans, the courts did find
certain  provision  of  the  contracts  unfair  (see  previous  section).  Nevertheless,  the  courts’
deliberations on the property rights have been quite accidental, in the context of discussing the
main legal issues of the case. Therefore, we should not rely heavily on court cases to address the
issue of a player’s interest in VAs any time soon. Even if more cases do appear, the outcome, at
least in the US might not be beneficial to the users (Randall, 2004; Quinn 2010).
In principle, the question of creating and/or recognising proprietary rights and interests in VWs
is not an issue that can be regulated by contracts, but instead is one of the general laws of
property/IP. In addition, an attempt of applying consumer protection law to virtual worlds’
EULAs and allocation of property therein is contrary to the views of many authors mentioned in
the subsequent section. This is because, VWs are not just games, and their inhabitants are not
just users or players, but instead can be considered as active participants and citizens of the
VWs, as indicated below.
CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF VIRTUAL WORLDS
Apart from allocating ownership over virtual assets, contracts have another important function:
governance of the VWs.
Contracts are an effective and highly significant regulatory tool in VWs (Jankowich, 2006;
Lastowka, 2010, Mayer-Schoenberger & Crowley, 2006; Balkin, 2004), giving usually only a
‘take it or leave it’ option to users, as mentioned in the section above (Jankowich, 2006, p 6).
Using mainly contracts, VW developers have ‘omniscient and godlike’ powers to control and
regulate behaviours and interest of players, turning them into their subjects (Erlank, 2012,
pp.75-76, 79; Jankowich, 2006). Jankowich coined a useful term for this regulation: ‘EULAw’,
thereby characterising these agreements as “non-negotiated, infinitely modifiable, proprietor-
friendly regulation” (Jankowich, 2006, p. 9). This is not a new phenomenon, though, as we have
a similar situation for all standard-terms contracts. What makes these contracts different is the
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substance they attempt to regulate in their provision.
The rules of EULAs and ToS govern both legal and environmental aspects of VWs, such as
etiquette, game rules, players’ conflicts, in-game crimes, privacy policy, business policies, real
world law of contracts, property, IP, dispute resolution (Jankowich, 2006, p 10; Linden Lab,
2014).  Contracts are,  therefore,  hybrid contract/property documents,  granting the users,  in
some cases,  limited property/IP rights in their creations.  They also exceed the principle of
privity of contracts (binding nature between the parties only) (Fairfield, 2009, p. 451), or in civil
law terms,  in personam  nature (Fairfield,  2009,  p.  429).  Therefore,  these contracts  create
pseudo-property,  pseudo-torts,  pseudo-criminal  and  pseudo-constitutional  systems.  Mayer-
Schönberger and Crowley rather sensibly characterise this phenomenon as constitutionalisation
of VWs (Mayer-Schoenberger & Crowley, 2006, pp. 1809-1810). Along the same line, Suzor
notes the constitutional tensions in the regulation of VWs, arguing for reconceptualisation and
evaluation of this framework, applying the rule of law principles to the private law regulation by
EULAs (Suzor, 2010).
The providers also have a very strong mechanism of enforcement,  through code (software,
architecture), by restricting access to the world ex post. They have the abilities to change the
worlds in any way they wish, to change their landscape, design functionalities and player’s
abilities (Balkin, 2004, p. 2049). In addition, one of the most effective methods of enforcement
for the breach of EULAs provision is expulsion. Here, users incur significant costs when forced
to leave the world, both in social (social capital, friends, built reputation, ties with one’s avatar)
and  financial  terms  (monthly  subscription  fees  and  loss  of  all  virtual  property  (Mayer-
Schoenberger & Crowley, 2006, pp. 1791-1792). They therefore rightly label VWs as “the most
Lessigian of all spaces of online interaction” (Mayer-Schoenberger & Crowley, 2006, p. 1791;
Lessig, 2006).
Constitutionalisation could also be perceived as a consequence of VWs being ‘places’ on their
own, with their own social interactions and culture, mimicking the real-world (Lastowka, 2010,
p. 10, 46, 190). The social significance and features of VWs have been studied by the scholars
from different disciplines, who embarked the task of explaining different social phenomena
within VWs. Thus, for instance, VWs are places with rich cultures, with many players engaging
in creation and art (e.g. films, called ‘machinimas’, created in the VWs and shared elsewhere
later,  e.g.  on  YouTube,  see  Lastowka,  2010,  p.  190).VWs  are  also  communities  with  an
impressive social cohesion (see an empirical longitudinal study that tested social ties within the
Everquest II, Shen, Monge & Williams, 2011). They are used to explore and develop language
skills (e.g. Tactical Language Project, developed at the University of Southern California Center
for Research in Technology for Education, have taught language using virtual environments, see
Fairfield, 2009, p. 1061); to engage in political activities (e.g. Second Life internal elections, or
2008 Hillary  Clinton’s  Second Life  campaign,  see  Wagner,  2004;  Holloway,  2007;  Crikey,
2007), for education (many notable education institutions, such as Harvard University or Yale,
have had their Second Life profiles, as VWs are used to explore how users learn from play, see
Oliver & Carr, 2009), military (e.g. virtual environment There has designed a Virtual Baghdad
project on commission for the Army, see Fairfield, 2009, p. 1060; Wertheim, 2004), medical
(e.g. therapists use them to treat patients with Asperger's Syndrome, see Fairfield, 2009, p.
1059) and many other purposes.
The individual, social and economic characteristics of VW encourage many writers to claim that
the worlds have “significance above and beyond their importance in the game context” (Chein,
2006, p. 1069). Therefore, as commentators observe “VWs are online places where games are
Virtual worlds players – consumers or citizens?
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 8 October 2014 | Volume 3 | Issue 4
usually played” (Lastowka, 2010, p. 119; Bartle, 2004). Some authors even suggest that players’
avatars should have the rights online that correspond to human rights,  since they are “the
manifestation of actual people in an online medium” (Koster, 2000). VWs are qualitatively
different from other kinds of games and real world social interaction, exactly by the unique
interplay of their features, particularly due to the fact that these interactions happen in an
environmentally peculiar, physical and 3D world (Erlank, 2012, pp. 51-52). Consequently, there
is a much richer potential for creation in and building of VWs, in comparison with, for instance,
social networks. The option and tools for creation are much more limited on social networks,
stemming from their web-based interface, the lack of physicality. The ability to create using
different tools and sharing these creations with a fellow user/player/citizen is one of the biggest
motives for a player to participate in a certain VW (Lastowka, 2013). These features support the
claim that further research is required on regulatory aspects of virtual worlds.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, the present forms of regulation of VWs through contracts and ‘code’ are not sustainable,
due to aforementioned arbitrary, unfair and ad hoc characteristics. As such, they are inadequate
tools for fair regulation of both the worlds as a whole, and the underlying social relationships
between players/users/citizens and providers (Jankowich, 2006; Erlank, 2012, Fairfield, 2009;
Lastowka, 2010, etc.). With regulation of VWs, these quasi-constitutions are unsuitable and
there  is  a  need  for  more  certainty  and  accountability  in  relation  to  the  player  interests.
Recognising the features of VWs, their distinct character and place-like qualities, it is necessary
to provide for a more balanced legal and regulatory regime to protect the VW citizens and their
interests (Lastowka, 2010, p. 17). This paper argued that the consumer protection legislation
cannot address these issues, as the interests such as property or intellectual property are beyond
the scope of this regime. It is also suggested that the problem could be addressed through
legislation/regulation that would mandate recognition of the users’ rights, acknowledging the
rights and interests of  the developer as well,  perhaps through the form of property/quasi-
property rights. In this regard, there is a need for further research that would suggest some
specific, nuanced regulatory and legal solutions, which would take a better account of the player
interests in virtual worlds.
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